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ABSTRACT 
INVESTIGATION WHETHER THE GERMAN CREDIT FINANCIAL MARKET 
IS PROMISING FOR CONSULTING FEES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO TRADI-
TIONAL COMMISSION BANKING 
Alexandra A. Behrens 
July st\ 2010 
This thesis is written to investigate if and how far the Gennan credit financial mar-
ket could be promising for consulting fees in the field of mortgage loan banking. 
The problem identified is an extensively discussed issue in the Gennan credit fi-
nancial sector. In solving the problem the author made some literature research and points 
out different modes of detennining consulting fees. The author faces the challenge that, 
up to now, there is hardly any literature on the application of mortgage loan consulting 
fees in Gennany. Secondly, a fonn concerning mortgage loan related business in con-
junction with customers' attitudes towards consulting fees was designed and distributed 
for a survey. In addition to the survey, a Monte Carlo simulation model shows the cohe-
rence of debiting consulting fees and the possibility of economies of scale for Gennan 
retail banks. 
The results of the study as well as the simulation model are astonishing and path-
breaking for further research on this topic in that there seems to be a basic willingness 
among prospects to pay consulting fees for mortgage loan consulting services that are 
presently offered for "free" in Gennany. Another main finding constitutes that even rather 
small consulting fees have a great effect on the revenue of the bank. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Motivation for Choosing the Topic 
In Germany and especially in the southern German area called Swabia there are 
some sayings that only if services have to be highly-paid, they are regarded as being wor-
thy. 
On the other hand exactly these Swabian people, amongst other groups of the Ger-
man consumers, expect services to be free of any charges, because - in contrast to the 
above mentioned sayings - they are simply not aware of the interlink between costs and 
the offered services. Alas, as a matter of course, they expect high-quality services. 
These two simple statements clearly show the dichotomy in German customer cul-
ture regarding the functioning of services. Hence, it is not surprising that a lot of services 
in Germany - if offered at all - are offered for free. However, most probably there is a 
high degree of cross-subsidization by the pricing of a product being linked closely to the 
service with adequate margins, to enable sustainable provisioning the services "for free" 
- at least from the customer's perspective. 
The above explained thinking resulted in a trend of more and more customers seek-
ing free advice at organizations that offer the above mentioned subsidized, i.e. "free", 
services but, after receiving the free service, purchasing products at the most inexpensive 
provider which, most often, has no sales and / or service organization and can thus pro-
vide lower prices than said subsidizing organizations. 
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In the German market this "cultural" consumer trend could firstly be observed with 
electric goods and books (Amazon. de) , later on with cars (Mobile.de) and many others. 
For instance, as far as books are concerned, many people still tend to make use of compe-
tent counseling services of up-front book stores and manually browse the exhibited books 
while planning to finally order a respective copy via Amazon.de or buch.de due to the 
lower prices or bonuses. 
Today almost any goods and services are offered directly via the Internet. Prices are 
either highly transparent or can at least be compared on an international scale. Expected-
ly, this trend didn't even stop over with highly specialized services such as retail banking, 
especially mortgage loan banking. 
Until today, the German financial market is dominated by commission banking. 
Beyond that, prospects are very price-sensitive. This mind-set was inter alia fostered by a 
very aggressive marketing strategy of the Media-Saturn / Metro Group: "Geiz ist geil" 
("avarice is wicked" 1). As a consequence, an increasing number of prospects adopted the 
following two-step approach: Firstly, seeking highly qualified consultancy of well-
established retail banks where they can expect optimal consultancy for free, and, second-
ly, contracting with another bank, preferably a cheap internet bank2 which offers no con-
sulting services at all, but offers more lucrative products and / or interest rates. Thus, the 
prospects profit from the good consultancy service while at the same time no counter-
value is established for the consulting institution, since contracting decisions are solely 
made on the basis of the cheapest price, respectively the best interest rate, which leads the 
prospects to the non-consulting cheap direct bank. 
1 Cf. Appendix I 
2 Also referred to as "direct bank" ("Oirektbank") in Germany 
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What most people ignore is that traditional banks with a conventional sales organi-
zation are just apparently more expensive than those without. If the sales-activity of the 
bank would be separated in firstly the consulting- and secondly the mere back-office or 
handling part, the activity would be more transparent and many customers would discov-
er that their house bank is on a competitive basis with the direct bank. Thus, in separating 
the two above mentioned activities, the customer would be able to recognize why he is 
paying a higher prize with his house bank than with the direct bank. Thereby, the consult-
ing part could be more appreciated in future. Especially this statement will be discussed 
later in this thesis in detail. 
2. Problem Discussion and Structure of the Work 
Up to now, as mentioned above, it is common in the financial sector in Germany to 
counsel clients and even potential clients for free. The provisioning of information, even 
rather elaborate financing concepts, by financial consultants to the customer is regarded 
as a complimentary service. This necessitates cross-subsidization of the consulting ser-
vices by the price of the product. 
Numerous recent investigations3 of well-established and independently operating 
consumer protection organizations such as "Stiftung Warentest" show that the consulting 
quality of banks and other financial service providers in Germany is very low. Why is 
that? Some say that bank consultants are salesmen for special products with high com-
missions rather than objective consultants. These "consultants" are only interested in op-
3 Cf. http://www.test.de/themen/gelda nlage-ba nken/testl Anlageberatu ng-von-Ban ken-Keine-beraet-
I th gut-1829939-1831738 June,14 2010 
The consulting quality of banks in Germany is very low. Only three out of 21 banks tested achieved "satis-
factory" status, whereas none of them achieved "good" or "very good". Two out of the 21 banks failed 
completely. 
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timizing their own salary by selling high-commission products no matter if these products 
actually fit the customers' needs. 
The approach of pricing specific financial services has been discussed and consi-
dered for a long time in Germany, but up to now service-pricing is not applied in any 
bank by default. By now, consulting fees are only common in big private banks in the 
field of asset management of considerable private funds. Hence, consulting fees in mort-
gage loan banking are a real niche in Germany. 
The thesis' contribution to this field of interest will be whether consulting fees in 
mortgage loan banking can be employed in the German market by now. For this purpose, 
an investigation on various aspects of mortgage loan banking has been conducted by 
means of a questionnaire4 which has been distributed to preselected participants. This 
investigation forms the second part of the thesis. 
The third part presents a basic model for a Monte Carlo simulation evaluating the 
effect of consulting fees on potential revenues in the field of mortgage loan banking. It 
also presents an approach for a proper implementation of the new pricing strategy based 
on consulting fees in retail business for mortgage loans. 
The last part comprises a summary of the major insights of this work and offers 
prospects for further research. 
4 Cf. Appendix IV 
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II. MAIN PART 
1. Pricing in Banking 
Traditionally, German banks are rather conservative when talking about prices. 
They rather talk about dues, terms or agio but try to avoid the term "price" itself or what 
the price contains (Wuebker et al. 2006). This habit changed during the last years because 
markets became global and diaphanous, and prices, particularly of products and services, 
became the critical parameter of competitions. 
1.1 Traditional Pricing of Mortgage Loans 
Although banks have ever since oriented the interest rate of a mortgage loan ac-
cording to the credit-worthiness of the customer, for a long time this was rather a subjec-
tive assessment of the bank-advisor for the pricing of the mortgage-Ioan6 instead of an 
established formula that could be verified by a third party. 
Most often, the price / the interest rate was also calculated by intuition ("How much 
is the customer willing to pay?") and or by comparing the own interest rates with the 
main competitor (Wuebker et al. 2006). 
With the introduction of the "Basel II Standard,,7 in 2007, this changed dramatically, be-
5 Appendix 2 
6 Credits were made by handsale on the basis of a long-establishes customer-bank-relationship with 
mutual trust and understanding. 
7 Basel II: Basel II is the second of the Basel Accords, which are recommendations on banking laws and 
regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
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cause now, every customer who was rated according to the IRBA8-approach has its own 
objective rating. Such objective rating is obtained by performing the complete modeling, 
validation, statistical calibration and implementation of this approach in the same way for 
all customers. For that reason, each customer has its own POD which is comparable with 
the POD of others and which can be undermined with a certain spread on the credit mar-
gin. This led to a wide spread between good and bad credit-worthiness ratios of the cus-
tomers. The above explained process enables the assignment of individual interest rates 
for mortgage loans of different customers, which accounts for their subjective risk situa-
tion. 
However, the explained process does not provide for explicit pricing of consulting 
services; they are rather mingled in the price of the mortgage loan and result in an in-
creased interest rate. 
8 "IRBA" means "Internal Rating Based Approach", see §SS SolvV (German law that provides for an 
adequate source of equity of German financial institutions) 
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1.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Traditional Pricing 
Some of the disadvantages of conventional, i.e. free, counseling approaches have 
already been broached in the introduction. 
Firstly, due to the effect of cross-subsidization, customers who do not require coun-
seling at all also have to contribute to counseling costs. I.e., they cannot be offered a fair 
price for the product or service they require due to the cross-subsidization. 
Moreover, most probably, since there is no well-defined price for counseling with 
the conventional approach, even bank counselors themselves may come to the conclusion 
that a frowsy, less accurate consultancy is good enough for a service that is for free. This 
is further supported by the informal style of counseling in the absence of counseling fees, 
since presently, there were only few requirements to document a counseling session. 
However, at least in the field of bond management, this problem has been addressed by 
German legislation, because since January 15t 2010 standardized, obligatory processes to 
document a consulting session9 have been defined. 
Still further, due to the lack of transparency regarding actual costs that are being 
caused by receiving consultancy, many customers tend to excessively use or even exploit 
consulting services, which may also be denoted as "consultancy grazing". 
From a corporate point of view, too, a lack of transparency regarding counseling 
activities is disadvantageous since a bank cannot obtain reliable data as to how much ef-
fort is actually spent for providing "free" consulting sessions. 
9 German Act Revising the Legal Relationship under Tranches of Debt Issues and Improvement of 
Enforceability of Investor Claims in the event of False Advice ("Gesetz zur Neuregelung der 
Rechtsverhaltnisse bei Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen und zur verbesserten 
Durchsetzbarkeit von Anspruchen von Anlegern aus Falschberatung") 
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The above observations evidence several severe disadvantages of traditional pricing 
approaches which merely focus on the product itself while neglecting service aspects. 
Nevertheless, two advantages of the traditional pricing methods are apparent: Firstly, the 
bank has no effort in calculating a value for services that are offered "for free". Secondly, 
the simplicity of such model is attractive and easy to understand for customers. 
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1.3 Alternative to Traditional Pricing: Consulting Fees 
Since 1993 there are hints in literature that the consulting service of a bank advisor 
has to be priced as substantial part of the whole "product" (Eberstadt, 1993). Eberstadt 
emphasized this by pointing out that the advice given by a bank clerk has the same signi-
ficance as the advice given by a lawyer or a tax advisor, i.e. a highly personal service. 
An expert consultation conducted in 1994 among executives in retail business in 
banks showed that two thirds of them were convinced that up to the year 2010 there will 
be major changes in the pricing policy (Severidt, 2001). There is evidence in 200912010 
that this might be true, because there are a lot of articles printed in trade press dealing 
with this issue in the last months, but a real breakthrough of this topic is still out of sight 
(Baulig, 2010; Schmidt, 2009). 
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1.4 Different Structures of Consulting Fees 
As there is hardly any material in literature on consulting fees in mortgage loan 
banking, the following observations dealing with possible structures to determine the 
height of consulting fees are derived from the neighboring field of asset management. In 
chapter 3.5, some of the insights of chapter 1.4 are transferred to the field of consulting 
fee pricing in mortgage loan banking. 
1.4.1 Quantitative Differentiation 
According to Eberstadt (Eberstadt, 1993), consulting fees can be determined based 
on the actual duration of a consulting session. Similarly to lawyers or tax consultants, the 
resource "time" is charged. Obviously, this model is based on the principle of causation. 
Each cost unit carries the costs which were actually caused. According to this statement, 
each consulting hour has to be priced adequately. For the details of pricing of one con-
sulting hour see chapter 1.6. 
A major disadvantage of this method might be that customers having a low amount 
borrowed might not be willing to pay high consulting fees, which in fact could result 
from complex mortgage loan structures regardless of the amount borrowed. Thus, the 
quantitative approach could lack customer acceptance especially for low credit amounts. 
For this reason, an option would be to provide three separate models of quantitative 
differentiation, e.g. 
a) easy consulting process and small credit amount, 
b) moderate complexity of consulting process, and 
c) high complexity of consulting process, 
wherein for each of these cases different hourly wage rates may be assumed. 
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The difficulty with these categories might be that "easy, moderate and complex" 
are very subjective terms and the customer would probably try to get in a lower category, 
i.e. range of hourly wage rate, by claiming that his mortgage loan is of low or moderate 
complexity. Hence, for successfully implementing the above categories, clearly defined 
criteria for the different categories are a prerequisite. 
A further disadvantage of the quantity-related model is the increased administrative 
effort (measuring time, categorizing, detailed billing etc.) of the bank. Moreover, custom-
ers could demand a really short advice, in order to save money, thus turning the consult-
ing principle into absurdity, because they either get an information overflow or the quali-
ty of advice is poor ("quick and dirty"). Furthermore, a confiding relationship to the bank 
advisor cannot be established within a short time though being essential for gaining cus-
tomer loyalty. This aspect, on behalf of the bank, could also be considered as an advan-
tage, because if customers are less time consuming, the bank can save money by reducing 
their sales-personnel in the mid and long run. 
The most essential disadvantage with quantitative differentiation, as with any other 
form of paid consulting services, too, is the increased probability of the customer chang-
ing banks easily, because he only occasionally asks for specific advice reducing his ten-
dency to rely on standard products of the bank. 
To mitigate this effect, volume discounts may be introduced for consulting hours or 
even prepaid flat rates as it is commonly accepted in telecommunication. Such prepaid 
consulting hours could also be bundled with standard products. 
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1.4.2 Perfonnance-Re1ated Differentiation 
According to Severidt (Severidt, 2001), another possibility to price a service could be the 
perfonnance-re1ated price-differentiation, wherein the value of the consulting perfor-
mance is measured by means of the attained annual rate of return. As a result, the cus-
tomer only pays a certain portion of this attained annual rate to the bank. One major ad-
vantage of this method for the client may be that only such banks will offer a service that 
are convinced of their own high perfonnance to attain high annual rates of return. Al-
though highly promising for the customer, the bank itself has a huge effort in setting an 
equitable assessment basis as well for the attained annual rate of return as the income 
compensation function. Thereby, the annual rate of return for the customer always has to 
be regarded in the context of the whole market development and / or the risk the customer 
has had with his investment 10. In Gennany, this model is predominantly found in asset 
management, where the asset manager is the person to decide which assets to buy and not 
the customer. This is because if the customer had influence on the asset to buy, the bank 
wouldn't have a real influence on the rate of return. The implementation of this model is 
really rare in Gennany, because the complete risk to perfonn is situated with the bank. 
1.4.3 Volume-Related Differentiation 
With this model, the customer would pay a pre-fixed amount of money only de-
pending on the credit volume of his mortgage loan. This fonn of payment would particu-
larly be independent of the complexity of the loan structure. 
An advantage of this model would be that customers are familiar with this type of 
pricing, e.g. from stock transactions etc. 
10 For example: The risk of a savings deposit is almost zero, thus, the annual rate of return is compa-
rably low in contrast to a high-risk Argentinian bond-option. 
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The volume-related differentiation could also be structured with different fees ac-




> 100,000, smaller than 400,000 0.4% 
>400,000 Individually, at least 0.2% 
1.4.4 Multi-Channel Pricing 
More and more customers vary their habits of contacting their bank. They no longer 
prefer to visit one of the subsidiaries to personally meet their advisor but rather tend to 
use different channels like telephone, Internet etc. (Wuebker, 2006). According to the 
different channels, it might be interesting to set up different prices for accessing these 
channels. E.g., the consulting fee for the advice via Internet or telephone may be cheaper 
than personal contact with a special advisor. 
1.4.5 Advantages of Consulting Fees 
There are according to Meyer (Meyer, 2006) some major advantages of consulting 
fees. 
The first one is consumer acceptance. By dividing the price into two components, 
i.e. a service component and a product component, the customer becomes aware of the 
true value of the consulting service, which increases his willingness to pay the price. Fur-
ther, for the bank advisor, consulting is no longer a mere means to get provisions but the 
center of his sales activities. The consulting fees thus adapt the customer's needs for a 
13 
high-quality advice to the advisor's need to earn money for the bank, which serves to 
alleviate an initial suspiciousness on both sides. 
The second aspect is enhanced objectivity. The original task of a bank advisor is 
to generate return for his bank. This sometimes does not meet the customer's require-
ments because in some cases it might be better for the customer to do nothing instead of 
buying any other product he doesn't really need. Therefore, if the income of the advisor 
would already be generated by the counseling process, and not only by contracting, the 
advisor had a minor interest to sell products with a high margin (Bernet, 1996). I.e., the 
pressure to sell useless products would be reduced, which fosters mid-term customer 
loyalty. 
The third aspect is the enhanced awareness for the "product" consulting service. 
Currently, a lot of banks try to differentiate themselves by the most melodious product 
names and their prices in order to waken customer's needs. And although every bank is 
convinced of their high consulting quality, e.g. "Deutsche Bank - Leistung aus Leiden-
schaff' ("Deutsche Bank - performance made of passion"), this attribute has only been of 
minor importance up to now. By pricing the consulting, the service itself is spotlighted 
and thus more attractive for customers. Moreover, quality differences can be made more 
obvious. In this context, the transparency of costs is another advantage of consulting 
fees for the customer and the bank, because it makes the costs of the service explainable 
to the customer which again goes along with more confidence in the bank. 
Another positive aspect of consulting fees could be the possibility for tax deducti-
bility. For instance, it would be interesting for customers who plan to buy a condomi-
14 
nium in order to rent it out afielWards, to generate high tax deductibility with the consult-
ing fees. 
Last but not least, consulting fees make it much easier for the customer to change 
the contractor, because there are no psychological barriers such as a bad conscience due 
to having received free advice. The danger of free-riders is extremely reduced. 
1.4.6 Disadvantages of Consulting Fees 
Lack of sales incentive: If the focus is no longer on selling commission-based 
products, sales consequently go down. And, congruously, due to a more objective advice, 
less provision-oriented products are sold. Therefore, the return generated of the high-
margin products diminishes and has to be absorbed by the returns generated through the 
consulting fees. 
Secondly, the cross-subsidization of products / services becomes more compli-
cated or even dies away completely because of the high market transparency. The major 
disadvantage here is, that banks have to "justifY" their prices. Where they were once able 
to sell a whole non-transparent bundle (product and service), they are now forced to re-
veal the price components in detail. 
Thirdly, there may be an inhibition threshold for some customers to seek a second 
opinion and to compare products or even to be advised at all. Thus, the advisor no longer 
has the chance to identify the customers' need on a personal and informal basis such as a 
free advice, because the customer doesn't show up in the advisor's office. In this context, 
cross-selling potential, too, might die away. If the customers' needs are not urgent, they 
no longer feel the need of paying for something they do not require. 
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Another aspect is that retail banks must fear public reactions, for the pricing of 
banking products in general is of high public interest. As a matter of cause, the pricing of 
banking products must be justified more often than products or services of other indus-
tries. In order to reduce these reactions, retail banks should precisely point out why they 
introduce consulting fees. The introduction should always be accompanied by e.g. a rise 
in consulting quality and/or the lowering of administration fees, credit interest rates and 
transaction costs (e.g. remittances). So it becomes clear to the public that these products 
formerly have been massively cross-subsidized. 
Another reaction could be evoked by the competitors. The banking sector is oli-
gopoly which means only a small numbers of big retail banks and a mass of private cus-
tomers. Due to high price pressure amongst the banks, it is really challenging for one of 
the institutions to make public apparent price raises. Due to this, consulting fees would be 
unsustainable unless 
All institutions would raise consulting fees or 
Consulting fees come along with higher consulting quality or 
The Introduction of consulting fees cross-subsidize the decline of transactional 
costs or interest rates 
(Severidt, 2001). 
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1.5 True Value of a Mortgage Loan Consulting Service 
Later on in this thesis, for the Monte Carlo Simulation part (chapter 3), it is impor-
tant to know what the real expenses for a bank for a mortgage loan consultancy are. 
This "true value" of a mortgage loan consulting service can be calculated with help 
of the following tables. They take into consideration the various procedural steps in the 
course of consulting. The duration in minutes of the respective steps were determined by 
expert questioning. 
TABLE II 
PROCESS STEPS AND DURATION OF AN EXTENSIVE MORTGAGE LOAN 
CONSULTANCY (WORST CASE APPROACH) 
Process Steps for an already existing Customer Duration in min 
Scheduling an appointment (via telephone, E-Mail etc.) 8 
Preparation of appointment 47 
Research 5 
Arrange customer information (via electronic devices) 4 
Prepare presentation 22 
Print and bind presentation 4 
Ask and prepare questions ofthe credit analyst 8 
Pre-Calculation for an offer (if known afore the appoint-
4 
ment) 
Conduction of appointment 119 
Travel time 21 
Conduct appointment 98 
Appointment - Follow Up Process 72 
17 
Documentation of appointment results 10 
Start advised processes 12 
Identification of cross-selling potential 9 
Analyzing customer documents 39 
Determine new product price (e.g. recalculation of the offer; 
7 
new calculation according to the customer's needs) 
Sum 253 min = 4 hours and 13 minutes 
TABLE III 
ADDITIONAL PROCESS STEPS FOR NEW CUSTOMERS 
Additional Process Steps for a new Customer Duration in min 
New customer: Additional processes 17 
Check, if customer already exists in electronic data base 2 
If not, apply new customer 3 
Apply new personal data and address 2 
Check legal requirements if necessary 2 
Apply new subscription of customer 8 
Pre-Calculation of product price on the basis of raw data 7 
Conduct first advice via telephone including first introduction 
30 
of the advisor oneself 
Sum 54 minutes 
To summarize: The "worst case" effort for a bank with an already existing custom-
er for a mortgage loan consultancy is about 4 hours. If the customer is new, the effort of 
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the bank / the consultant rises by approximately one hour, which means 5 hours of con-
sulting and administrative effort in sum. 
To calculate the costs per hour, respectively the cost per given advice, the labor 
costs and their composition have to be calculated. 
The basis of Table IV is the collective labor agreement in "Tarifvertrag des privaten 
Bankengewerbes in Deutschland"ll. Each employee has to work 7 hours and 48 min a 
day within around 230 working days per year (vacation already subtracted). In sum, these 
are 1,794 working hours per person per year. 
In combination with Tables II, III, it can be determined, how much an average con-
sultancy of a mortgage loan really costs. 
TABLE IV 
DETERMINING THE LABOR COSTS PER HOUR OF A BANK ADVISOR 
Component Costs in € 
Salary (Per year) 60,000 
Ancillary labor costs (Additional 20% of the salary) 12,000 
Support (Secretary, assistant, back office etc.) 25,000 
Work place (Lease, heating, office equipment, company 
15,000 
car, etc.) 




Overhead (Brochures, gifts, events etc.) 1,000 
Sum 124,000 
Costs for 1794 working hours (230 days) 124,000 
Costs for 1 hour 69.12 
11 Collective labor agreement of private bank sector in Germany 
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Costs for the mortgage loan advice for an already exist-
ing customer 
Costs for the mortgage loan advice for a new customer 
291.69 
353.89 
For the Monte Carlo Simulation Part, it is necessary to split the above listed costs 
into variable costs and fixed costs, as presented by Table V. 
As fixed costs only those costs are considered that exist, no matter if the advisor is 
employed or not. As variable costs only the real labor costs are considered. 
TABLE V 






Salary per year 60,000 
Ancillary Labor costs 12,000 
Support 25,000 
Workplace 15,000 
Electronic devices 10,000 
Advertisement 1,000 
Overhead 1,000 
Sum: 52,000 72,000 
Costs for one hour 28.99 40.13 
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1.6 Summary 
Although numerous studies show (Baulig, 2010) that bank managers are convinced 
that consulting fees will playa major role in future, banks will have difficulties in intro-
ducing the new model, which is based on consulting fees, because for almost all German 
banks it is a new business concept. 
The following aspects should be taken into consideration when implementing con-
sulting fees: 
Advantageously, the consultant is independent because he is not influenced by the 
need of maximizing his / her own salary. Hence, he has a sustainable consulting 
approach based on the economic well-being of his customer. 
The consulting fee paid is adequate for the provided consultancy service, particu-
larly for the provided special know-how and time of the consultant. 
The consulting fee is transparent and free of any third party commissions. 
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2. Empirical Study and Results 
2.1 Structure and Conduction of the Study 
The questionnaire used for the study contains twelve questions relating to consult-
ing fees in mortgage loan banking (Appendix IV) and was distributed in March and April 
2010 to about 260 people, whereof 96 people replied within the deadline. Thus, the return 
rate is about 37%, which is comparatively high for an empirical study based on a ques-
tionnaire. The 260 participants of the study represent no arbitrary cross-section of the 
population; they rather constitute a pre-selected sample of mainly people with higher 
education and special knowledge of economic principles (e.g. business economists, eco-
nomical engineers, business people, jurists and bank employees). The target group of the 
questioning comprises friends, colleagues, students at the author's former university and 
family members. This pre-selection was useful in that it narrowed the target group of 
people interested in mortgage loans to a certain degree. Further, the target group most 
probably represents a cross-section of what is considered as typical middle-class house-
holds in Germany. This represents the mortgage-loan prospects of banks sought after. 
The questionnaire was provided in two languages, German and English, with iden-
tical content. Most people handed back the German version. The questionnaire was pre-
dominantly distributed via E-Mail and to a minor degree manually. Filled in question-
naires were returned in an anonymous fashion. 
Some of the questions have multiple answers, if reasonable. This is why the sum of 
percentages may be more than 100% (on the basis of 96 replies), which is actually the 
case for all ofthese questions, i.e. numbers 1, 2, 4, 5 and 9. 
All other questions (numbers 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12) only allowed a single choice. 
In these cases, too, the sum of percentages sometimes does not amount to 100% (e.g. 
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99%, 98.7%). This is due to the fact that not all questionnaires were properly answered. 
Some interviewees obviously forgot to answer one or more questions. If the answer rate 
was not too low, however, these responses were considered, too. 
Only three responses did not meet the author's expectations as to proper answering 
and were not considered for analysis at all. 
2.2 Social Structure of the Target Group 
Question numbers 10, 11, 12 are related to social parameters of the target group. 
Below, the results of these questions are discussed to provide information on the social 
structure of the interviewees prior to dealing with material aspects of consulting fees in 
the field of mortgage loan banking. 
2.2.1 Age Pattern of the Interviewees 
• 20 < x < 30 years 
• 30 < x < 50 years 
• > 50 years 
FIGURE 1: Age Pattern; Results of Question Number 10 
The majority of interviewees are aged between 30 and 50 years, i.e. the preferred 
target group for mortgage loans, whereas only about one fifth is older and about one 
quarter lies between 20 and 30 years. 
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Please note: In the course of the investigation, no responses from people below the 
age of20 were received. Therefore, this group is not depicted in the diagram of Figure 1. 
2.2.2 Marital Status of the Interviewees 
• Unmarried 
• Married 
FIGURE 2: Marital Status; Results of Question Number 11 
The distribution of the participants in the study is almost equal. 
Moreover, a correlation between marital status and the answering of the following 
questions related to consulting fees could not be detected by reviewing a plurality of 
samples. 
24 




• Scholar / Student 
• Retired 
FIGURE 3: Occupation Group; Results of Question Number 12 
Most of the people questioned in the survey are employees. The graph of Figure 3 thus 
properly reflects the overall structure of German working society. 
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2.3 Questions and Results related to Mortgage Loan Banking and Consulting Fees in 
Detail 
2.3.1 Question 1: Category of Financial Institution 
6.3% 
• Savings bank / Credit union 
• Private banks (DB, DreBa) 
• Insurances 
Thrift institution 
• Direct banks 
• Others 
FIGURE 4: Which Category of Financial Institution does the Bank belong to where 
you concluded your Mortgage Loan Agreement / which Category of Financial Institution 
do you plan to choose for contracting your Mortgage Loan? 
What is really interesting about this graph is the fact that savings banks and the cre-
dit union play, with a quota of almost Y4, a dominating role in the mortgage loan sector. 
This is due to the fact that these institutions have their focus on their customers. This cri-
terion, as it will be obvious later when discussing question number 9, is still a very im-
portant one. 
The second largest part of providers is represented by thrift institutions. Notably, 
savings banks / credit union and thrift institutions were often listed in combination in the 
questionnaires, whereas combinations of thrift institutions and other providers only playa 
minor role. 
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The predominance of the combination of savings banks / credit union and thrift in-
stitutions really makes sense for the customer. Why is that? In Germany, retail banks 
provide special, usually extremely low, interest rates for mortgage loans. This is by rea-
son that these mortgage loans are secured by a residential property charge, most often in 
combination with a life insurance. As a result, the POD of the involved retail banks is 
rather low. The height of this "cheap" mortgage loan is strictly limited to at most 80% of 
the value (purchasing / construction costs) of the property. The overall duration of such a 
mortgage loan is up to 30 years with a minimum annuity of 1 % at the beginning. For 
those cases, in which the customer requires between 80% and 100% 12 of the property 
value as loan, he will have to find further credit institutions to finance the remaining up to 
20%. In this context, thrift institutions offer a solution in form of a further mortgage loan 
with comparatively low interest rates. They also want to be secured by the same residen-
tial property charge but they subordinate their claim behind the savings bank / credit un-
ion. To compensate this effect, they claim higher annuities from their customers, up to 
8% a year. 
A further insight obtained from the diagram of Figure 4 is that private banks only 
pay a minor role, which might be due to primarily being regarded as the banks of corpo-
rate clients or the preferred bank for people not depending on mortgage loans. Often, pri-
vate banks are also regarded to be the right choice for investment purposes, but not for 
(private) credit purposes. 
Last but not least, a somewhat surprising aspect of Figure 4 is that direct banks only 
playa minor role in mortgage loan business even though they regularly offer the lowest 
12 Receiving more than 100% as a mortgage loan, as is possible e.g. in the USA, is not possible in Ger-
many. 
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interest rates of all mentioned institutions, which is in contrast to the above-discussed 
distinct price-sensitivity of German mortgage loan prospects. However, as the answers to 
question number 2, which are discussed in the following chapter, will show, price is in 
fact a really important factor but not the dominating one. The most important factor 
turned out to be the "main bank". 
2.3.2 Question 2: Reasons for contracting with a specific Bank 
8.3% 
• Overall Service 
• Quality of Advice 
• Processing Time 
Advisor 
9.4% • Interest Rate 
• Main Bank 
• Other 
FIGURE 5: Why exactly did you choose / do you plan to choose that Bank for con-
tracting your Mortgage Loan? 
This graph, above all other results, shows the strong binding of German customers 
to their main bank. The statement of the graph is that almost two thirds of the customers 
stick to their main bank for mortgage loan purposes. In the author's opinion, this factor 
makes other aspects of the consulting process take a back seat, even such factors which 
are more tangible e.g. due to their cost-intensive nature (processing-time or advisor) 13 • 
The author is also convinced that a lot of banks are oblivious to this fact and waste a lot 
13 The author acknowledges that - at least to some degree - further "influences" for the main bank 
loyalty may exist, such as convenience. 
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of money and time in improving the above mentioned tasks of minor importance instead 
of investing money in fostering and maintaining the customer-bank relationship, which 
according to Figure 5 presumably yields the best leverage effect. 
Moreover, according to the author's knowledge, German banks primarily invest in 
quality and price, which necessitates considerable marketing expenses because all other 
competitors invest in that area, too. However, Figure 5 of the study shows that these fac-
tors are ranked only second and third. 
Obviously, what the customer really wants is a stable, reliable and secure financial 
partner for the "whole life", which is embodied by the depicted loyalty to his main bank. 
The long maturity of mortgage loans (regularly up to thirty years) further supports the 
customer's wish for stability. 
The following strategic ideas can be derived from the analysis of Figure 5: 
1. Banks should spend more money to foster and maintain the customer rela-
tionship, i.e. by creating special products for their loyal customers'4. 
2. Secondly, due to the importance oflow interest rates as evidenced by Figure 
5, banks should invest in creating strategies to lower the overall prices and 
costs to be able to offer such lower interest rates's. 
Moreover, service and quality of advice also play an important role, each of them 
counting with about 28%. 
Regarding the advisor's importance as far as question number 2 is concerned, it is 
surprising that the person of the advisor obviously only plays a minor role in the contract-
14 Promising models may e.g. be based on offering better interest rates and/or better maturities for 
loyal customers. Well-established customer loyalty programs of other industries could also serve as a 
basis for such models (e.g. frequent flyer programs). 
15 In this context - as already mentioned above - a fortiori, it astonishes that cheap direct banks play 
a minor role in mortgage loan activities. 
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ing context (26%), although the process of advising can be considered as a highly per-
sonal service on the basis of mutual confidence. This brings the author to the conclusion 
that people and advising services in their area of responsibility are exchangeable. I.e., it is 
not the people that make customers loyal to their bank. Supposedly, there are more im-
portant factors that the personal factor. 
Another surprising effect derived from Figure 5 is the lack of importance regarding 
processing time, which direct banks are known for due to their lean structures. Neverthe-
less, due to the lack of significance of processing time as a competitive factor in mort-
gage loan consultancy, direct banks cannot profit from it in this area. 
2.3.3 Question 3: Customer Loyalty in Terms of Time 
2.1% 
2.1% 
• < 1 year 
• 1 < x < 5 years 
• 5 < x < 10 years 
> 10 years 
. 1 have none 
FIGURE 6: For how long have you been a Customer with your Bank? 
The result of this question encourages the findings of question number 2. Almost % 
of the interviewees stick to their main bank for more than 10 years. This is all the more 
impressive when considering the age pattern of the participants, see chapter 3.2.1. Over 
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80% are younger than 50 years and a major group of those people maintains a long-term 
relationship to their main bank. In combination with the green piece of pie, which 
represents mid-term relationships between 5 and 10 years, almost 85% stay with their 
main bank for 5 years and longer. 
2.3.4 Question 4: Possible Reasons for paying for a Service 
6.3% 
• The price would drop 
• Quality of advice would rise 
• The advice would be more 
extensive 
Advice would be more 
(product) neutral and less 
provision oriented 
• Advice is only debited if you 
would choose to contract with 
another bank 
FIGURE 7: Up to now Advice for Mortgage Loans is free with almost all German 
Banks. Could you imagine paying Money for that Service in the Future if so, for what 
Reason? 
This question was aimed to ascertain the customer's further requirements if he 
should pay for a service in the future which was for free until now. The astonishing result 
is that in the present context, as in contrast to question number 2, price is not the domi-
nating factor (though highly important) but "a more product neutral and less provision 
oriented" approach in giving advice to the customer. One reason for that result might be 
the bad news releases bankers generally face in Germany since the global financial crisis. 
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Currently, German media unequivocally constitutes that, in order to supplement their 
income, bankers only sell those products with high provisions no matter what the cus-
tomer's need really is. According to the author's opinion there are, like in every branch of 
economy, some rotten apples, but of course, the above mentioned situation is not the gen-
eral habit of bankers. 
Another reason for the high demand for product neutral advice certainly is the lack-
ing comparability of per se "plain vanilla" banking products. Of course, every bank offers 
checking accounts and mortgage loans. Unfortunately, every bank provides individual 
euphonic names for the plain vanilla products thus obstructing the customer's view on the 
services rendered and consequently impeding price comparisons. 
The next important criterion is, as could already be expected, the price component. 
People want to have cheaper "products" (in this case the mortgage loan) if they pay a 
price for the service additionally. Thirdly, they want to pay the additional service fee only 
if afterwards they choose contracting with another bank. 
Especially the latter offers the possibility to introduce consulting fees in the Ger-
man mortgage loan market. According to the American saying "There ain't no such thing 
as a free lunch", every prospect should be aware that a highly complicated service can no 
longer be offered for free. Therefore, he needs to pay for the service. If he contracts with 
the bank that offered the service, he has either the chance to get his money refunded or 
the payment should be taken into account by the bank when calculating the (lower) inter-
est rate. In the last part of this thesis, the author provides a brief outlook of how this strat-
egy could be implemented. 
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2.3.5 Question 5: Height of Fees for Mortgage Loan Consultancy 
.< 100 
• > 100 but less than 200 
> 200 but less than 500 
>500 
• Depending on the amount 
borrwed up to 0.1% 
FIGURE 8: How much Money are you willing to pay for a good, extensive Advice 
for Mortgage Loans? 
As could already be apprehended in view of the importance of low prices, a consi-
derable group of about 35 percent of the respondents are only willing to pay up to 100 € 
for a mortgage loan consultancy, which is only a fractional amount of the whole consul-
tancy effort I 6. Moreover, the "up to 100 €" class of response also includes the case of 
zero, for there are a lot of respondents who are not willing to pay any money for the con-
sultancy l7. The more interesting is the fact that those are predominantly the group that is 
more in favor of the standardized model (Figure 9). 
16 Cf. Table IV 
17 A future version of the questionnaire could be improved by adding a separate field of choice which 
covers the "zero" option . The author has been notified in writing by numerous respondents on their non-
willingness to pay any money. 
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• Individual mortgage loan 
advice with costs 
• Standardized model 
exempt from all charges 
FIGURE 9: Willingness to pay less than 100 €; Individual Model versus Standard 
Model 
Only very few are willing to pay 500 € and more, i.e. an amount which comes close 
to the actual costs, which is not really surprising. A potentially interesting group of pros-
pects for a bank are the 25% that are willing to pay depending on the amount borrowed, 
as will be explained by the following calculation examples: 
TABLE VI 
CONSULTING FEE DEPENDING ON THE AMOUNT BORROWED 
Mortgage loan volume Percentage depending on the amount borrowed up to 0.1 % 
0.01% 0.05% 0.1% 
50,000 5 25 50 
100,000 10 50 100 
250,000 25 125 250 
500,000 50 250 500 
1,000,000 100 500 1,000 
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A predominant number of mortgage loans are up to € 250,000 in southern Germa-
ny. Thus, in combination with the results of Figure 8 above, a percentage between 0.05% 
and 0.1 % can be assumed as optimal for the target group. 
As could be derived from question number 1, savings banks and credit union are 
those that form the majority for offering mortgage loans. Therefore it is interesting, if the 
willingness to pay of that groups' customers differs a lot from the overall result. 
.< 100 
• > 100 but less than 200 
3.08% 
• > 200 but less than 500 
> 500 
FIGURE 10: Possible Consulting Fees in Savings Banks / Credit Union in contrast to 
the overall Result 
About 5% more prospects are willing to pay an amount that is higher than 100 €, 
but less than 200 €, and about 3% more wish to pay depending on the amount borrowed 
up to 0.1 %, as compared to the overall result of Figure 8. 
In addition to that, it is also interesting what prospects of a private bank think about 




• > 100 but less than 200 
• > 200 but less than 500 
> 500 
• Depending on the 
amount borrwed up to 
0.1% 
FIGURE 11: Possible Consulting Fees in private Banks in contrast to the overall Re-
sult 
The graph shows that almost 50 % are willing to pay between 200 € and 500 €, 
which is comparatively high and could potentially cover the actual costs as estimated on 
the basis of expert questioning I 8. 










18 Cf. Table IV 










up to 0.1% 
> 50 years 
.30 < x < 50 years 
• 20 < x < 30 years 
FIGURE 12: Possible Consulting Fees depending on the Age of the Prospect 
As also revealed by numerous other investigations l9, "older people", i.e. aged 40 
and above, are more willing to pay a higher sum for being consulted than younger people, 
which may at least partly be due to their better economic status and further factors such 
as marital status20 . 
The second statement is that people aged 50 and above prefer the idea of paying on-
ly the sum depending on the amount actually borrowed. 
2.3.6 Question 6: Customer's Bank Preferences 
. Yes 
Doesn't matter 
FIGURE 13: Would you rather prefer contracting with a Bank that takes Money for 
Mortgage Loan Advising? 
This is a very interesting result. Though many people are willing to pay money for 
mortgage loan consultanc~l , only about 12% would rather contract with a bank that of-
fers a paid service. This could be interpreted to reflect the fact that prospects do not nec-
19 Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Technologie 2009: Purchasing Power of people aged 60 and 
above: 317 € billion in Germany (2007); consumer share aged 50 and above: 52% (2005) 
http://www.wirtschaftsfaktoralter.de/fileadmin/user upload/I nfoflyer Wirtschaftsfaktor Alter Ol.pdf 
20 Cf. the "DINK" (double income, no kids) effect 
21 Cf. Figure 7 and 8 
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essarily link paid services with good consulting quality (yet). In other branches this often 
is the deciding correlation. The more it costs, the better it is. 
2.3.7 Question 7: Preferred Consultancy Model 
• Individual mortgage 
loan advice with costs 
• Standardized model 
exempt from all 
charges 
FIGURE 14: Please imagine you could choose between two Types, an Individual 
Mortgage Loan Advice with Costs and a Standardized Model exempt from any Charges. 
Which one would you choose? 
This graph shows the distribution of the preferred advice model. Almost 2/3 of the 
interviewees prefer the individual model which is a clear signal to banks to extend and 
enhance their product range. Not surprisingly, many people that do not want to pay a 
large amount of money prefer to choose the standard model (see Figure 9). 
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2.3.8 Question 8: Number of Bank Connections 
>3 
FIGURE 15: Question 8: How many different Bank Connections do you currently 
have? 
Although Germans are really loyal to their main bank, almost 3;4 have two to three 
different bank connections. But even those that have more than one bank have a very 








FIGURE 16: Customer loyalty in Correlation to the Number of Bank Connections 
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Evidently, this binding is even stronger with those clients that have more than one 
bank connection (see Figure 17), which is very astonishing. Therefore, this could be the 
main target group for the banks. 
2.3.9 Question 9: Reasons for different Bank Connections 
• Price 
• Quality of Advice 
6.3% 
• Competence 
• Variety of products 
• Proximity to customer 
• Image 
• Other 
FIGURE 17: What are the Reasons for these different Bank Connections? 
This graph shows why customers have different bank connections and can be as 
well an indicator for banks in which area they should improve as a hint which areas are 
not that important when not being the main bank. 
One of the dominating factors is again price which clearly shows that people want 
to compare prices in order to get the lowest one. An interesting part of the cake diagram 
is the "quality of advice" which is relatively low with around 10% compared to question 
Number 2 where the "quality of advice" was estimated with around 30%. This means that 
people often have these separate bank connections in addition to one bank they rely on 
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most. As the author knows, these separate bank connections provide e.g. checking ac-
counts for free or provide very low stock transaction costs. Still, the proximity to the cus-
tomer is a very important criterion. Especially in times of the ongoing financial crises 
banks tend to close their affiliates in order to save real estate costs. This is a problem, 
especially for older, not very mobile, people that depend on the branches and advisors up 
front. 
Another astonishing result was the important role of the "variety of products". As 
the author didn't expect, prospects like the perspective of many different products in or-
der to compare the advantages and disadvantages of these. 
2.4 Summary 
From the results of the study discussed above, a basic willingness to pay for con-
sulting services in mortgage loan banking can be derived. Most probably, however, cus-
tomers would not accept consulting fees in a height suitable for covering the actual costs 
caused by a typical consulting process22• 
22 Cf. Table IV 
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3. Monte Carlo Simulation: Effects of Consulting Fees on the Revenue of Mortgage 
Loan related Business 
3.1 Basics about Monte Carlo Simulation (MC) 
"Simulation is the process of designing a model of a real system and conducting 
experiments with this model for the purpose either of understanding the behavior of the 
system or of evaluating various strategies (within the limits imposed by a criterion or set 
of criteria) for the operation ofthe system.,,23 
According to Hillig (Hillig, 2005), the term "Monte Carlo Simulation" is an allu-
sion to the coincidental component of gambling in the casinos of Monte Carlo. Moreover, 
it means that the behavior of the system is probabilistic which means that the model is 
based on the use of random numbers. 
The bases of MC simulation are random experiments that are conducted frequent-
ly. According to the results of the MC simulation and probability theory, problems can be 
solved numerically that cannot be solved analytically, i.e. by evaluating an equation sys-
tern. To justify this assumption the "law of large numbers,,24 can be consulted. A popular 
example of an MC Simulation is the approximation of 1t according to Buffon's needle 
problem. 
3.2 Structure ofthe Mortgage Loan Revenue Model 
To estimate the revenue a bank can gain in the course of mortgage loan contrac-
tions, the below depicted assumptions for the model (see Figure 18) are proposed which 
consider the principle influences on potential revenue. The model is based on a basic 
profit equation which enables to determine the revenue depending on several parameters 
23 Shannon, R.E. (1975), page 2 
24 The relative frequency of a random result approaches the probability of this random experiment if 
this random experiment is conducted frequently. 
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such as a number of contracts, variable costs depending on the contracting process and 
fixed costs. More specifically, the model comprises two contributions to revenue, the first 
of which reflects what may be considered the standard portion of revenue in mortgage 
loan banking, namely the margin. The second contribution defines possible effect of con-
sulting fees on the revenue. In analogy to the basic profit equation, fixed costs and varia-
ble costs are deducted from the aforementioned contributions to the revenue term. 
To determine the first contribution to revenue, the model considers a consulting 
agent of a bank who conducts a certain number of consulting sessions per year. The ac-
tual number of mortgage loan contractions - as a consequence of said consulting sessions 
- is derived from the number of consulting sessions by means of the contracting rate, the 
value range of which has been chosen on the basis of expert questioning in the field of 
mortgage loan consulting. I.e., as illustrated by Figure 18, the consulting agent's consult-
ing process is modeled by a first random parameter (number of consulting sessions) and 
by said contracting rate, which is also a random parameter. 
The margin-based contribution to revenue is finally evaluated by multiplying the 
contracting rate with the number of consulting sessions, which yields the number of con-
tracts per year. The number of contracts per year is transformed to actual revenue by mul-
tiplication with a fictitious amount borrowed and the margin, both of which are also con-
sidered by the present model in the form of random parameters. 
The second contribution to revenue is constituted by the consulting fees, which -
according to the model - are only debited in the case of non-contracting and are assumed 
to be constant, i.e. non-random. The consulting fee-based profit component - in contrast 
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to the margin-based profit-component - only contributes to estimated revenue in such 
cases, where a consulting session has taken place but has not led to a contract. 
As will be explained in detail in chapter 3.3 below, the depicted model has been 
evaluated for various scenarios being characterized by different values for the consulting 
fees ranging from 0 €, 100 €, 200 €, 300 € to 500 €. The case of 0 € consulting fees ob-
viously reflects the current situation. 
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~egend: 












FIGURE 18: Assumptions for the Model 
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estimated revenue 
3.2.1 Assumptions for Input Data 
TABLE VII 
RANDOM VARIABLES OF THE MODEL 
Fonnula Type of distribu- Mean Standard 
Input Data 
Symbol tion value deviation 
Amount borrowed AB Nonnally 150,000 € 50,000 € 
Specially generat-
Margin M ed25 based on ~ l.2 % 
expert knowledge 
Number of consult-
N Nonnally 180 20 . . 
mg seSSIOns 
Duration of consult-
D Nonnally 3h 1 h . . 
mg seSSIOns 
Contracting Rate P Nonnally 35% 5% 
TABLE VIII 
FIXED VARIABLES OF THE MODEL 
Input Data Fonnula Symbol Value 
Fixed consulting fee F 0; 100 € - 500 € 
Hourly rate for consulting session 
R 40.18 € 
according to Table III 
Fixed costs according to Table III FC 52,000 € 
25 Cf. chapter 3.2.3 
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The model is thus based on the following formula: 
Estimated Revenue = N * P * AB * M + N * (1- P) * F - (N * D * R + Fe) 
Equation 1 -
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The amount borrowed is used in the present model as the basis for determining the 
margin-related revenue component of the estimated total revenue. A normal distribution 
is assumed to properly reflect actual numbers. According to the author's knowledge, the 
mean amount borrowed per person for a mortgage loan in southern Germany is around 
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FIGURE 20: Histogram of the "Margin" 
The "Margin" was more complicated to simulate than other random variables of the 
model, where a straightforward normal distribution could be employed. This is due to the 
fact that there are a lot more customers with a bad credit rating than those with good 
ones. As was explicated before, the credit margin in Germany is based on the POD which 
is basically the credit rating. Thus, to properly reflect the real situation in southern Ger-
many, the Margin must have a lot of values higher than 1.2% but only a small number of 
values below 1.2% and rather none of them below 0.4%26. 
The mean value is situated around 1.2%. The special distribution shown above was 
generated by overlaying several distributions with different mean values and standard 
deviations to generate a graph that represents reality approximatively. To account for a 
26 For margins below 0.4%, the bank wouldn't make any money because the fixed costs were not cov-
ered at all. Margins around 0.4% are only reserved for A+ (exceptionally good) credit ratings. 
48 
majority of margin values exceeding 1.2%, a squared normal distribution was added with 
a weighting factor that has been obtained by experiment. 
3.2.4 Number of Consulting Sessions 
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FIGURE 21: Histogram of the "Number of consulting sessions" per Year per Advisor 
As already defined by Table VII, a normal distribution was found to properly re-
flect the current consulting sessions situation. The distribution of the Number of Consult-
ing sessions was designed with a mean value of 180 sessions and a standard deviation of 
15 sessions, which has been verified by expert questioning. This value is based on a rea-
listic approach for a bank advisor specialized in the field of mortgage loan consultancy 
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This value is used to determine variable costs involved in the consulting process. 
According to the author's own experience, a profound mortgage loan consultancy takes 
around 3 hours. Therefore, the mean value was set to three hours, the standard deviation 
to 1 hour. This value is about 25% lower than the example calculated in Chapter 2.5 . The 
difference is that Chapter 2.5 reflects on an extensive advice (worst case), whereas this 
example focuses on a standard mortgage loan advice. An extensive mortgage loan advice 
can take up to 6 hours which is also represented in the graph above but which does not 
reflect the standard situation. 
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The above shown histogram of the nonnally distributed contracting rate has a mean 
value of 35% and a standard deviation of 5%. The comparatively low contracting rate is 
due to the fact that Germans like to compare prices and services. Almost everybody in-
vites more than one offer before deciding upon a precise offer. Most people even invite 3 
or more offers. Thus, it was assumed that the real contracting rate is around 35%, the rest 
are only offers to compare. In this context it is obvious how important it is to introduce 
consulting fees because most offers do not lead to a contract. 
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3.3 Evaluation ofthe Model 
Equation 1 has been evaluated 10,000 times based on the above explained random 
variables and fixed parameters to obtain the simulation results explained in the following 
chapters. 
3.3.1 Estimated Revenue - Present Situation 
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FIGURE 24: Estimated Revenue based on Consulting Fee "0 €" (present state) 
Figure 24 shows the present situation of the estimated revenue of mortgage loan 
consultancy. As the graph shows, statistically roughly 15% of given consultancies are not 
profitable for the bank, because they yield a non-positive estimated revenue, which is on 
the one hand due to low margins27 and I or a low amount borrowed, and on the other hand 
due to a high probability of non-contractions though having the fixed costs of the consult-
27 Which does for example not represent an adequate risk of the credit 
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ing agent. More precisely, a detailed evaluation of the data basis for Figure 24 yielded a 
rate of 12 % of unsuccessful, i.e. non-lucrative consulting sessions28. 
The following simulated estimated revenues will demonstrate the effect of a con-
sulting fee on the profitability of the bank regarding mortgage loan consultancy. 
3.3.2 Estimated Revenue - 100 € Consulting Fee 
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FIGURE 25: Estimated Revenue based on Consulting Fee "100 €" 
As calculated anew (see Figure 25), now, only 7.3% of the consultancies are not 
profitable for the bank, which gets obvious by considering Equation 1: 
Estimated Revenue = N * P * AB * M + - eN * D * R + Fe) 
Most terms of the formula do not change compared to the standard case, but the 
green part of the formula does. In the standard case, this green term results in "0" due to 
the vanishing consulting fees (F = 0). Now, by means of the non-vanishing consulting 
fees, the bank generates extra money even if people fail to contract with the bank. Thus, 
the sum of the total estimated revenue increases. 
28 Also cf. Table IX 
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On a first glance, the overall improvement (only about 4.7%) of the estimated total 
revenue generated by the consultancy fee (100 €) seems to be relatively small. This im-
pression, however, is deceiving, because in fact, the bank lowered the risk of unprofitable 
mortgage loan banking contracts for about 40% by introducing a comparatively low con-
sulting fee. 
3.3.3 Estimated Revenue - 200 € Consulting Fee 
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FIGURE 26: Estimated Revenue based on Consulting Fee "200 €" 
Given again Equation 1, the green term, compared to FIGURE 26, gets bigger de-
pending on the consulting fee. 
Estimated Revenue = N * P * AB * M + - (N * D * R + Fe) 
In the present case, the risk of unprofitable mortgage loan banking is only about 
3.9%, which means a reduction of 67% of the risk for the bank in comparison to the stan-
dard version without 0 € consulting fees. 
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3.3.4 Estimated Revenue - 300 € Consulting Fee 







300 HI;;I" ........ ···· ...... · ........ · .................. · .... ···· .......... ··· ................ ·· .......................................................................................................... · .......... · ........ · .. · ........ ·i .. 0,6 
2S0 · .... · 




0 .'·-....,..,,.....,...,.... .... 
8 g 8 8 8 8 is g 8 g is 8 8 g 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
'" " '" ... "- m 9' " '" m ... ~ '" <1> co ':- ~ ~ ~ N , ,., '" " '" 
,. ., 
V V V V V V 
v 
ffi v v v v v v ffi '" '" ffi ffi ffi " ~ f5 ~ ffi w ffi f5 '" :5 u " II V Ii II il V V 0 ~ v v ~ v v v v 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 
8 co to .-, n n 0 '" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 " 0 ~ N co " '" ., N c '" '" 1 " .... N .. '" '" '" ~ ? ': 'Q ~
"'.·1 .. '1 ...................... · .................. · .................. · .................. · ...................................................................................................................................... ; .. 0.55 
g 8 8 
0 0 0 
m "- ... 
0 ... "' .... ....
v v v 
ffi u: '" '" '" V " " v v 
" " " 0 0 0 0 § CJ '" " 0, C! 
, ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. j 0,5 
8 8 8 8 
0 0 0 0 
'" m ,,", "-'" "' " '" .... .... .... .... 
v v v v 
ffi ffi ffi a; H' 
" " il V v v v 
0 " " 0 0 0 0 0 




.................... _... 0,3 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 " 0 ,.. ell " m .... .... " "" m 0 '" N .. '" " " '" ... 0' N " N N N C, N "' v v v v v v v v v
u: Fi ffi If. ffi '" " ffi a; 1:1 '" 1,1 '" II " V " H V v v V v v v 




........... .................. .; 01 
, o:orl 
o 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
" ... '" '" '" .... 
,.. 
"" " '" N " "' '" 00 co .... "' M '" "' m "' '" "' 0, " "" "" " v v v v v v v v v v 
~ a: '" '" ~ "' u: '" ffi '" ", '" '" ,,' \:1 li l ,,' 1: " ., 0 " II " V " v v v v V v v v 
" " " " 0 0 " " " Q 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 '" 0 '" ~ is 0 '" ? '" ~ " 
., N " ., '" '" ;, '" ,- 0, 0 
,.. ,,' ~ co m '" m 
.,
'" " 
FIGURE 27: Estimated Revenue based on Consulting Fee "300 €" 
In this case, the risk of unprofitable mortgage loan banking is only about 2.4%, 
which means a reduction of 80% of the risk for the bank in comparison to the standard 
version without consulting fees . 
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3.3.5 Estimated Revenue - 500 € Consulting Fee 
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FIGURE 28: Estimated Revenue based on Consulting Fee "500 €" 
If one considers the 500 € case (see Figure 28), it is obvious that the bank' s risk to 
generate unprofitable mortgage loan consultancies almost faded to zero (exactly: 0.5%). 
Unfortunately, this scenario will be hard to establish in German banking industry, 
because only very few prospects are willing to pay such a huge amount of money as 
could be derived from the results of the study in Chapter 2. 
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3.4 Discussion of Results and Prospects 
3.4.1 Estimated Revenue - Summary Remarks 
sao Overlaid Histograms: 
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FIGURE 29: Estimated Revenue based on Consulting Fee - Overview 
Figure 29 above depicts smoothed histograms for estimated revenue for a compari-
son of different values for the consultancy fees. It is obvious that the effect of the consul-
tancy fee is the most important when considering low total revenues. The higher the 
overall revenue, the effect of a fixed consultancy fee gets less important. These cases are 
dominated by huge values of amounts borrowed and / or huge margins (because of the 
high POD). In these cases, it is not necessary to charge the consulting fee at all. 
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FIGURE 30: Probability of profitable mortgage loan consulting sessions 
Figure 30 depicts the probability of profitable mortgage loan consulting sessions, 
i.e. estimated revenue ER > = 0, over the consulting fee in €. Apart from the samples al-
ready discussed above (situation for F = 0 €, 100 €, 200 €, 300 €, 500 €), intermediate 
values can also be gathered from this graph. Apparently, the slope is steepest for low 
consulting fees, i.e. substantial effects on estimated revenue (ER) can already be achieved 
by introducing comparatively low consulting fees . Moreover, evidently, the most signifi-
cant improvement of ER is achieved by providing non-vanishing consulting fees at all. 
Table IX depicts an overview on the enlargement of profitability by increasing con-
suIting fees. The "best" risk reduction cases are highlighted in green. 
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TABLE IX 
RISK REDUCTION MATRIX 
Consulting fee 
Statistical profitability 
Enlargement by Risk 
in€ increased consulting fee Reduction 
0 88% - -
100 92.8% 4.8% 40% 
" 
200 96.6% 8.6% 72% 
300 97.8% 9.8% 82% 
400 99.1% 11.1 % 92,5% 
500 99.5 % 11.5% 96% 
3.4.3 Prospects 
As an extension to the presently analyzed simulation model, it could be interesting 
not only to vary the consulting fee as a constant parameter but also to vary some other 
parameters as the Duration of the consulting session (D) time and / or the Contracting 
rate (P). 
As for the consulting session, it might be interesting to introduce a time factor that 
is coupled to the amount of money paid (e.g., the more money the customer spends, the 
more time he receives for the consultancy). 
With regard to the contracting rate, it might be interesting to introduce a factor that 
boosts or reduces the Contracting rate depending on the consulting fee. This effect is 
supported by the assumption that the more money a prospect spends with the consulting 
bank, the more likely it is that he stays with it to be credited the consulting fee he paid in 
advance. 
Moreover, the model may also be extended to further specialized areas of consult-
ing services where the introduction of consulting fees is likely to be considered. 
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3.5 Possible Approaches to introduce a Mortgage Loan Consulting Fee in German Re-
tail banks 
Based on the results of Chapter 2 and the results of the model in Chapter 3 obtained 
from the Monte Carlo simulation, it is obvious that the introduction of consulting fees is 
indeed promising in that it contributes to maximizing the estimated revenue for a bank in 
the field of mortgage loans. 
And yet, since willingness of prospects to pay for related consulting services is ra-
ther limited as evidenced by the results of the study, see Chapter 2, several issues will 
have to be addressed for a successful realization of paid services in the field discussed. 
Thus, the author suggests two alternative approaches. 
Firstly, a quantitative approach is proposed, the basic principle of which has al-
ready been explained in chapter 1.4.1 with reference to asset management. In literature 
(Severidt, 2001), a cost-covering approach is suggested, but German customers most 
probably won't pay around 70 € per hour of consulting. But, as the survey of Chapter two 
also shows, amounts between 100 € and 200 € for four to five hours of consulting would 
be accepted, which relates to an hourly rate of around 25 €. In the light of Table IV, this 
clearly is not cost-covering for the bank, but it would be a first step in the "right" direc-
tion. As already discussed with reference to Figure 30, however, the mere introduction of 
a consulting fee has the strongest impact on estimated revenue. 
Secondly, the quantitative approach could be extended by elements of a volume-
related approach such as modifying the consulting fee based on the amount borrowed. 
The following combinations could be imaginable: 
On the basis of the amount borrowed, the customer pays a pre-determined fee of, 
for example 0.1 % of an exemplary amount borrowed of 250,000 € which results in an 
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absolute value of 250 € for the consulting fee earned by the advisor. If the customer con-
tracts with the bank, he gets his money back. 
The main advantage for the customer is the time-flatrate nature of such approach, 
i.e. the customer pays a predetermined amount of money, no matter how long the consult-
ing session takes. 
On the other hand, disadvantageously for the bank, with small volumes (e.g., 
50,000 €) the consulting fee is very small (with 0.1 % = 50 E), although the given advice 
may be really time consuming. Another disadvantage may be that the customer fraudu-
lently pretends a small volume to save money and contracts with another bank after hav-
ing received the advice. Such "strategies", however, could be undermined by defining a 
fixed minimum consulting fee that is high enough to discourage fraudulent actions. 
The above explained volume-related approach could be extended by introducing a 
time and / or complexity component. On the basis of actual time consumption for the 
given advice and the intended amount borrowed, the consulting fee as determined by the 
approach explained above is modified, which enables to appropriately account for con-
suIting processes of increased complexity. This approach is demonstrated by the follow-
ing examples: 
TABLE X 
COMPLEXITY AND TIME RELATED APPROACH 
Amount borrowed29 Estimated Time for 
Hourly Rate 
Estimated Consulting 
(Volume; up to) Consultancy in Hours Fee for the Advisor 
50,000 € 1-2 50€ 50 €-100 € 
100,000 € 1-2 60 € 60 €-120 € 
29 Assumption : Complexity increases by increased amount borrowed 
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200,000 € 2-3 70 € 140 € -210 € 
500,000 € 3-6 SO € 240 €-4S0 € 
The main advantage of the approach illustrated by Table X is a fair determination 
of the consulting fee, since it accounts for the amount borrowed, the complexity and the 
duration of the consulting session. Thus, it is no time-flat rate for the customer. 
As with any other time dependent approach, the customer might stick to his watch 
in trying to save consulting fees. Possibly, there will be no trustful atmosphere and there 
may be some losses in communication. 
The above discussed approaches may serve as a basis for banks to introduce con-
sulting fees in mortgage loan banking and may be extended according to the respective 
business concept. 
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III. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Conclusion 
In Gennany, it is a very emotional controversy whether to introduce consulting fees 
as an alternative to the standard approach or in addition to traditional commission bank-
ing. Sometimes it even seems doubtful on which side to find the better advisors: commis-
sion bankers or consulting fee bankers (Hom, 2010). 
In future, a big task will be not only to define correct and adequate pricing systems 
for consulting fees, but it will also be necessary to define a new occupational image for 
the bank advisor based on consulting fees. Typical providers of other highly personal 
services such as tax advisors or jurists may serve as an adequate example. 
More important than defining the new occupational image, however, is the creation 
of a sound pricing model for consulting fees in mortgage loan banking taking into con-
sideration the findings of the present thesis. 
Generally, it has been shown that the introduction of consulting fees is promising in 
that it contributes to maximizing the estimated revenue for a bank in the field of mort-
gage loans. 
A key insight of the thesis reveals that the decisive factor is the very introduction of 
consulting fees, whereas their absolute value is of secondary concern. 
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2. Future Research 
For future research in context of the Monte Carlo Simulation model it might be in-
teresting to apply a specific stress-testing approach called sensitivity analysis. 
Sensitivity analysis is used to determine how "sensitive" a model is to changes in 
the value of one or multiple of the parameters and to changes in the structure of the 
model. By showing how the model behavior responds to changes in parameter values, 
sensitivity analysis is a useful tool in model building as well as in model evaluation. 
Thus, sensitivity analysis helps to build confidence in the model by studying the uncer-
tainties that are often associated with parameters in models. 
Furthermore, sensitivity analysis allows determining what level of accuracy is ne-
cessary for a parameter to make the model sufficiently useful and valid. If the tests reveal 
that the model is insensitive, then it may be possible to use an estimate rather than a value 
with greater precision. Sensitivity analysis can also indicate which parameter values are 
reasonable to use in the model. If the model behaves as expected from real world obser-
vations, it gives some indication that the parameter values reflect, at least in part, the 
"real world" (see Breierova et al. 1996). 
In the context of this thesis it might be interesting to apply sensitivity analysis at 
least to the following parameters of Equation 1. 
Firstly, the number of consulting sessions, for this parameter might undergo certain 
decline because there might be far less consulting session than assumed in chapter 3 if 
customers had to pay for the consulting service. And secondly the margin, which is due 
to the current instability of the financial markets that might result in dramatically rising 
margins during the next months. 
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APPENDIX I: AVARICE IS WICKED 
SOURCE: INTERNET 
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APPENDIX II: DOMINATING PRICE FACTOR IN BANKING 
SOURCE: INTERNET 
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50 Euro if you like us, 100 if 
you don't. 
Why Postbank? Because I 
think dues are undue! 
APPENDIX III: CREDIT RATING RELATED MORTGAGE LOAN PRICES 
Verind'etrun 9 des Ktredi1pr,eises 
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Source on the basis of: http://www.banklounge.de dated 2010-03-17 
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APPENDIX IV: QUESTIONNAIRE 
I) Zu welcher Institutsgruppe geh6rt die Bank, bei welcher Sie Ihre Baufinanzierung 
abgeschlossen haben / wo planen Sie, Ihre Baufinanzierung abzuschliegen? 
Which category of financial institution does the bank belong to where you con-
cluded your mortgage loan agreement / which category of financial institution do you 
plan to choose for contracting your mortgage loan? 
D Sparkassen / Volksbanken D Savings bank / credit union 
D Grogbanken (DB, DreBa etc.) D Private banks (DB, OreBa) 
D Versicherungen D Insurances 
D Bausparkassen D Thrift institution 
0 Direktbanken D Direct bank 
D Andere D Others 
II) Warum haben Sie / planen Sie, gerade bei dieser Bank Ihre Baufinanzierung 
abzuschliegen? 
Why exactly did you choose / do you plan to choose that bank for contracting your 
mortgage loan? 
D Service D Overall Service 
D Beratungsqualitat D Quality of advice 
D Abwicklungsdauer D Processing time 
D Betreuer D Advisor 
D Zinssatz D Interest rate 
D Hausbank D Main bank 
D Andere D Other 
(Mehrfachnennungen m6glich) (Check all that apply) 
III) Wie lange sind Sie bei Ihrer Hausbank bereits Kunde? 
For how long have you been a customer with your bank? 
D < 1 Jahr D < 1 year 
D l<x< 5 Jahre D 1<x< 5 years 
D S<x<10 Jahre D S<x<10 years 
D >10 Jahre D >10 years 
D Ich habe keine Hausbank D I have none 
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IV) Bislang ist die Beratungsleistung fUr Baufinanzierungen bei nahezu allen deutschen 
Banken kostenlos. K6nnen Sie sich vorstellen, fUr diesen Service zukOnftig Geld zu 
bezahlen, wenn dadurch 
Up to now advice for mortgage loans is free with almost all German banks. Could 
you imagine paying money for that service in the future if so, for what reason? 
D Der Effektivzins fUr den Kredit sinkt o The price for the mortgage loan would 
drop 
ODie Beratungsqualitat steigt o The quality of advice would rise 
ODie Beratung umfanglicher ist o The quality of advice would be more 
extensive 
ODie Beratung produktneutraler und o The advice would be more (product-
objektiver wird (weniger provisionsorientiert) )neutral and objective (less provision oriented) 
ODie Beratungsleistung nur dann in o The Advice is only debited, if you 
Rechnung gestellt wird, sofern Sie die would choose to contract with another finan-
Baufinanzierung bei einem anderen Institut cial institution 
abschlieBen 
(Mehrfachnennungen m6glich) (Check all that apply) 
V) Wie vie I Geld sind Sie bereit fUr eine gute, objektive Baufinanzierungsberatung 
auszugeben? 
How much money are you willing to pay for a good, extensive advice for mortgage 
loans? 
0<100 0<100 
D >100 aber weniger als 200 o >100 but less than 200 
D >200 aber weniger als 500 D >200 but less than 500 
0>500 0>500 
D Abhangig vom Darlehensvolumen bis o Depending on the amount borrowed 
zu 0,1% mit Sockelbetrag up to 0.1% 
.. 
(Mehrfachnennungen moglich) (Check all that apply) 
VI) WOrden Sie eher bei einer Bank Ihre Baufinanzierung abschlieBen, die die 
Beratungsleistung fUr Geld anbietet? 
Would you rather prefer contracting with a bank that takes money for mortgage 
loan advising? 
DJa o Yes 
o Nein ONo 
o Spielt keine Rolle o Doesn't matter 
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VII) Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie konnten zwischen zwei Modellen entscheiden, einer 
individuellen kostenpflichtigen Baufinanzierungsberatung und einem kostenfreien 
Standardprogramm. Welches wurden Sie wahlen? 
Please imagine you could choose between two types, an individual mortgage loan 
advice with costs and a standardized model exempt from any charges. Which one would 
you choose? 
o Kostenpflichtige Individualbaufinanzie- D Individual mortgage loan advice with 
rung costs 
o Kostenloses Standardmodell D Standardized model exempt from 
charges 
VIII) Bei wie vielen Banken sind Sie derzeit Kunde? 
How many different bank connections do you currently have? 
o 2-3 
0>3 
IX) Was sind die Grunde fUr eine Mehrbankenverbindung? 
What are the reasons for these different bank connections? 
o Preis D Price 
o Beratungsqualitat D Quality of Advice 
D Kompetenz D Competence 
o Produktvielfalt o Variety of Products 
o Kundennahe (Filialnetz) o Proximity to customer 
o Image des Instituts D Image 
o Andere o Other 
(Mehrfachnennungen moglich) (Check all that apply) 
X) Wie alt sind Sie? 
How old are you? 
o <20Jahre D <20 years 
o 20<x<30 Jahre o 20<x<30 years 
o 30<x<50 Jahre D 30<x<50 years 
0>50 Jahre D >50 years 
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XI) Wie ist Ihr Familienstand? 
What is your marital status? 
D Ledig D Unmarried 
D Verheiratet D Married 
XII) Welcher Berufsgruppe gehoren Sie an? 
Which occupation group do you belong to? 
D Angestellter D Employee 
D Selbstandiger D Free-lancer 
D SchOler / Student D Scholar/student 

















APPENDIX V: NOMENCLATURE 
Amount Borrowed 
Confer 
Duration of consulting Sessions 
For Example 
Estimated Revenue 
Fixed consulting fee 
Fixed costs 
Id est = that is 
Internal Rating Based Approach 
Margin 
Monte Carlo (Simulation) 
Number of consulting sessions 
Contracting Rate 
Hourly rate for consulting session 
Probability Of Default 
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